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The objective of this paper is to analyse whether auditors comply with the standards
currently in force when writing audit reports in Spain. We try to obtain evidence for
the relationship of the errors contained in the report with the type of opinion figuring
in it, and with the auditor issuing it. This study is based on a sample of 1236 reports
selected by the stratified random sampling method, for the period 2004–2007. Once
we had defined the dependent variable, the number of errors committed in the report,
the independent variables, the type of auditor and type of opinion, we tested the
hypotheses by means of a regression analysis with the aim of estimating the average
number of errors that can be found in a report according to the variables described.
The results obtained permit us to conclude that reports with a qualified opinion
contain a greater number of errors, and that they are committed to a greater extent
by individual auditors than by companies and by multinationals.
Keywords: audit quality; auditor errors; opinion of reports; types of auditor
JEL classification: M42
1. Introduction
As affirmed by Kluger and Shields (1989), the quality of the accounting information
contained in financial statements depends, among other factors, on the techniques used
by the auditor to evaluate the relevance and reliability of the firm’s accounting informa-
tion. The summary of the work carried out by the auditor takes the form of the audit
report, so this is a document of vital importance, being the medium of communication
between the auditor and the users, both external and internal, and must be free of errors
and, as the Technical Audit Standards1 indicate, as clear as possible.
Given the influence of audit reports over decision-making for the different users of
information, our paper attempts to show the importance of erroneously issuing a report
with mistakes, hence auditing regulators must take measures to correct this problem, in
order to improve the quality of reports.
In Spain, there exist studies that analyse the quality of auditing through variables
such as the independence of the auditor, audit committees, problems associated with
performance of multiple services or with training needs, but we have not found papers
focused on measuring the quality of the audit report through analysis of any errors that
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might be contained in it. The objective of this research paper is to make known the
different types of errors contained in audit reports on annual accounts, by quantifying
them and relating them with the type of opinion given in the report and with the auditor
who issues it. This was done by analysing a representative sample of audit reports of
annual accounts between 2004 and 2007, formulating a set of hypotheses that try to
respond to the objective set by means of multivariate regression models.
This paper is structured into six sections. After this introduction, in the second
section we review the literature. In the third, we suggest the hypothesis. In the fourth
section, we describe the sample to be studied, define the variables and the methodology
used in the empirical study. In the fifth, we detail the results obtained, finalising in the
sixth with the conclusions drawn from our study.
2. Literature review. Errors in audit reports
The main objective of auditors is to create trust between firms and their stakeholders
(Libby, 1979). Several researchers state that the auditor’s role is to increase the trust in
the information presented through the audit report (Bhattacharjee, Moreno, & Yardley,
2005; Dunn, 1996). However, there exist differences between users’ expectations of the
information they are to receive and what the auditors in fact communicate (Brown,
Hatherly, & Innes, 1997; Duréndez, 2003; Humphrey, Moizer, & Turley, 1992; King,
1999). Therefore, the audit report is an essential medium for improving communication
between auditors and the users of the information (Humphrey et al., 1992). Authors
such as Hayes, Dassen, Schilder, and Wallage (2005, p. 51) affirm that ‘functional audit
quality is defined as the degree to which the process of carrying out the audit and
communicating its results meets a customer’s expectations’.
The content of the audit report is important because the message that the auditors
try to communicate through it could be misinterpreted (Bailey, Bylinski, & Shields,
1983; Bamber & Stratton, 1997; Libby, 1979). Hence, the form and the content of the
audit report has been criticised by various authors (Bamber & Stratton, 1997; Brown
et al., 1997; Citron & Taffler, 2004; Holt & Moizer, 1990; Humphrey et al., 1992; King,
1999; Libby, 1979). Other authors refer to the utility of the audit report (Bamber &
Stratton, 1997; Dopuch, Holthausen, & Leftwich, 1986; Duréndez, 2003; Pringle, Crum,
& Swetz, 1990).
All the member states of the European Union have legislation that specifies both the
form and the content of audit reports, which are thus standardised and permit detection
of whether or not reports are written out in accordance with established auditing stan-
dards (Hayes et al., 2005; Spathis, Doumpos, & Zopounidis, 2003). The literature has
provided evidence of the existence of errors when writing out audit reports of annual
accounts in accordance with the stipulations in the audit standards in force in their coun-
tries and which make reference to the degree of compliance with these standards on the
part of the auditors, relating to errors both of format and of content of the reports (see
Table 1).
3. Hypotheses
3.1. Arguments about the influence of the opinion in audit reports
Spain, like other countries of the European Union, has a corporate law that specifies
what should be the format and content of audit reports. According to Spanish law, the
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wording and content of the audit report is not free. The audit report must have a mini-
mum content referred to in accordance with articles 51 of Directive 78/660/EEC, on the
annual accounts of certain types of companies, and 37.2 of the VII Directive 78/660/
EEC, to the consolidated financial statements in order to promote the comparability in
the international economic environment.
The audit report model in Spain is regulated in Article 3 of the Law on Audit of
Accounts. The Spanish Institute of Accountancy and Audit of Accounts (ICAC) includes
standard reports that auditors should use in their Technical Audit Standards. The format
and content of the audit report is covered in Section 3 of the Technical Audit Standards.2
The opinions that can be included in an audit report are clean opinion (unqualified
opinion) and unclean opinion (qualified opinion). The unclean opinion includes:
unqualified opinion, disclaimer opinion and adverse opinion. A report with unclean
opinion is more extensive, it contains a greater number of paragraphs which describe
the reservations (breach of accounting principles, omissions of information, scope lim-
itations, ...). Consequently, an audit report with an unclean opinion is a longer report,
more technical, with a greater amount of information.
When an auditor issues an unclean opinion it should include one or more explana-
tory paragraphs, in which the auditor should clearly describe the nature and reasons for
the reservations and should quantify the effect of the reservations on the annual
accounts. Furthermore, Spanish law specifies the format and content that these explana-
tory paragraphs should have. Therefore, these characteristics can result in there being a
higher probability of the auditor making mistakes when writing a report with an unclean
opinion. These errors are studied by several authors. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Šapina
and Ibrahimagić (2011) classify errors as errors of a ‘formal nature’ (the subject of the
audit incompletely or incorrectly defined, the responsibility of the Bureau for financial
reports incompletely or incorrectly defined, incorrectly stipulated auditing standards,
incomplete description of audit process) and errors of a ‘substance nature’ (auditor
inserts his own remarks into ‘notes on the financial statements’, misunderstanding of the
limitations of the audit scope, missing quantitative description of financial consequences
caused by spotted irregularities, emphasising the facts that are not to be emphasised). In
Sweden, Kier and Lavesson (2010) classify the errors as: ‘form errors’ and ‘content
errors’. The study contains two dependent variables called total form (measured as a
sum of the scores from eight different variables) and total content (measured as a sum
of the scores from 16 different variables).
In Spain, several authors (Alcarria, 1997; Cabal, 2001; Cabal & Robles, 1998; López-
Corrales, 1997, 1998; López, Martínez, & García, 1997; Gutiérrez, 2009; Hernández &
Vidal, 1998) observe that the auditors make more errors in reports with unclean opinion.
In general, they observe: incorrect handling of accounting principles and methods, incor-
rect treatment of situations because of uncertainty, a failure to include the omission of
information detected in the annual accounts of the audited company, a failure to correctly
record going concern situations or tax contingencies in explanatory paragraphs, a failure
to reflect the scope limitations under current regulations, errors in the wording of explana-
tory paragraphs (no quantification, insufficient information, complicated and user-
unfriendly language), confusion between different types of qualifications (reservations).
In relation to the opinion paragraph, partial reports or reports that contain two opin-
ions (circumstances expressly prohibited under Spanish law) have been detected, as well
as a failure to include circumstances from explanatory paragraphs in the opinion. This
leads to our first hypothesis in null terms:
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Hypothesis 1: The type of opinion does not influence the errors committed in the audit
report.
3.2. Arguments about the type of auditor and its relationship to audit report quality
As affirmed by Duréndez and Sánchez (2008) the auditor can be considered responsible
for the report; as in previous literature the size of the auditing firm has been observed
to be a subrogate for the quality of the audit (Carcello & Nagy, 2004; Colbert &
Murray, 1998; Cravens, Flagg, & Glover, 1994; De Angelo, 1981; Fargher, Taylor, &
Simon, 2001; Kane & Velury, 2004; Moizer, 1997; Nair & Rittenberg, 1987; Palmrose,
1988; Piot, 2001; Sainty, Taylor, & Williams, 2002; Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, &
Raghunandan, 2003). Feroz, Park, and Pastena (1991) state that the size of the auditor
is a good subrogate for measuring the quality of the audit, as small American audit
firms receive higher penalties than the large audit firms from the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) for deficiencies committed.
The image that users have of auditors is different depending on the type of auditor. In
Spain, García-Benau, Garrido, Vico, Moizer, and Humphrey (1999) analyse audit service
quality, in order to verify users’ image of auditors, reaching the conclusion that there are sig-
nificant differences between their image of the big audit multinationals and the rest. In the
Czech Republic, Sucher, Moizer, and Zarova (1999) observed that audited firms perceive a
different image of the audit multinationals from that of the rest of the small local auditors,
and associate it with a better quality of audit when it is carried out by the big firms.
The reputation of the multinational firms is different from that of the small and med-
ium firms and individual auditors: in general the multinationals have a better reputation, as
found by Francis and Yu (2009), Francis and Wilson (1988), Khrisnan and Khrisnan
(1996), Rollins and Bremser (1997), Sundgren (1998), Sucher et al. (1999) and, Ferguson
and Stokes (2002). On the other hand, Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang (2011) set out
arguments to the effect that the ‘Big Four’ and the rest of the audit firms must provide
comparable levels of audit quality, since both types of auditors perform their work to the
same standards and should therefore deliver a reasonable level of quality. Furthermore,
‘the “Non-Big-Four” have better knowledge of local markets and a better relationship with
their clients’ (Louis, 2005), permitting the ‘Non-Big-Four’ to better detect irregularities.
In Sweden, Kier and Lavesson (2010) made a study of the analysis of compliance
with audit standards in relation to their format and content for a sample of audit reports,
trying to test, among other hypotheses, whether firms listed on the Stock Exchange and
audited by one of the Big Four issue audit reports that are more correct in form and
content. The results regarding the impact of the audit firm indicate that there is a nega-
tive relationship between the use of a Big 4 firm and the correctness of the audit report.
These studies show that the type of auditor influences the perceived quality of the
audit report, and therefore the errors committed by the auditors in writing out their
reports. We therefore propose the following hypothesis in null terms:




Our first source of information to be able to obtain the audit reports on annual accounts
that would form our population were the five Spanish companies’ registries located in
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the Region of Galicia (region located in northern Spain). These registries contributed
information on 4100 audit reports on annual accounts between 2004 and 2007.
As our objective was the analysis of the audit reports of four consecutive years
(2004 to 2007), we eliminated those firms for which we did not have the reports for all
four consecutive years.
The sample was chosen by the stratified random sampling method without replace-
ment, where the strata are the sectors of activity to which the firms of our population
belonged, with distribution proportional to the number of firms in the sector. In our case
we set the estimation error ε=0.01, and since there were no previous studies determining
the value of ph (proportion of reports of sector h that present no errors), for every h =
1,2,…, H, we considered the most unfavourable case, i.e. ph=0.5 for every h = 1,2…,H.
The sample size obtained for each year is n=309 audit reports.
The selected sample was carried out for unlisted companies. The reason for selecting
unlisted companies is that the majority of the existing studies of audit reports are made
for companies listed on the stock exchanges, and this information is easily accessible
and costs the user nothing. In our opinion and in the opinions of others (Carson et al.,
2012), studies that analyse the audit reports of small and medium firms3 are needed.
Small and medium firms form a very important part of countries’ business networks,
especially in the case of Spain, where SMEs represent 99.88% of current existing firms
(Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism, 2012).
We must make it clear that our study contains the limitation that the sample selected
is not representative of all the Spanish business fabric; as already indicated it refers only
to one Region of Spain, implying that the results obtained cannot be extrapolated to the
rest of the country (regions). However, itis important to note that Spain is a diverse
country. Spain is known for being a country of regional heterogeneity in terms of
institutions and economic activities (Maté, García, & López, 2009). Spain consists of 17
regions, which contain cultural and linguistic (there are four official languages) aspects
and clear differentiations among economic sectors. In particular, the north regions of
Spain, to which our study refers, are characterised by having greater independence in
both government decisions and for regulatory practices. Duréndez and Maté (2012) con-
ducted a study of the Spanish regions with the aim of analysing the role of the spatial
factor in the determination of audit quality and the results confirm the existence of a
location effect according to which the highest quality values are found in the most
developed Spanish areas (the north regions).
Currently, most existing studies in Spain and at an international level refer to
samples of companies that are chosen over the total population of a country. However,
taking into account existing regional heterogeneity in some countries, we believe it
would be worthwhile conducting studies that analyse the different European regions
with similar characteristics.
4.2. Variables
An audit report on financial statements is considered wrong when it does not comply
with current regulations. In Spain, the reports must meet the standards contained in the
Technical Audit Standards for reports issued by the Spanish Institute of Accountancy
and Audit of Accounts (ICAC).
To proceed to identify an audit report with errors, we analyse the various elements
contained therein. In the analysis we note that there are reports that do not comply with
the Audit Technical Standards, and therefore are considered erroneous.
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The classification of the errors was done taking into account the importance, value
or relevance that the error detected could have for the clarity of the audit report. We
classify the dependent variable, errors committed by the auditors in audit reports, as:
 Insignificant errors: referring to defects, imperfections or deficiencies detected in
the reports that refer to errors of form. Their existence does not imply reduced
understanding by the reader or user of the report.
 Significant errors: omission or inadequate presentation of relevant or important
information in the audit report. Their existence implies that the reader or user may
have difficulties in understanding the report or may lack information considered
necessary for decision-making, and so may make incorrect decisions.
The appendix contains a table with the description of the principal errors found in
audit reports, classified as insignificant and significant.
Šapina and Ibrahimagić (2011), show the existence of errors in the audit reports of a
sample of firms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, classifying them as errors of a formal nature
and errors of substance nature. Kier and Lavesson (2010), examine how auditors deviate
from the Swedish audit standards when writing out the audit reports of firms on the
Stockholm Stock Exchange, classifying these deviations as errors of form and of content.
Initially, the independent variables considered are: type of auditor, type of opinion,
firm size, auditor switching, date of report, the professional bodies and industry. In mak-
ing the correlations between these variables, a problem of multicollinearity between
variables has been detected, except among type of auditor and type of opinion. There-
fore, the variables considered as independent were the type of auditor and the type of
opinion, which we identify below.
4.2.1. Type of auditor
With the aim of specifying whether some auditors have a greater propensity to issue
reports with errors, they were classified into three categories:
 Multinational, including both those known as the ‘Big 4’ (Deloitte, PriceWater-
houseCoopers, KPMG and Ernst & Young) and other multinationals (BDO, Hor-
wath, Moore Stephens, and so on).
 National audit firm, companies that perform their services only in Spain.
 Individual auditor, exercising on a self-employed basis.
This classification is based on the fact that the firms forming our sample are not
listed in the securities market, this classification being consistent with the structure of
the Spanish audit market, where there exist clear differences in the market share of
international and national firms (Duréndez & Sánchez, 2008; García-Benau,
Ruiz-Barbadillo, & Vico, 1998).
4.2.2. Type of opinion
The reports were grouped according to two types of opinion:
 Unqualified opinion.
 Qualified opinion, including the opinions; qualified, disclaimer and adverse.
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Both the Spanish4 and international5 standards contemplate four types of opinion to
be issued in audit reports: favourable, with qualifications, refused and unfavourable. But
from the empirical evidence of the existing literature, (Ahadiat, 2011; Caso, García,
López, & Martínez, 2003; Duréndez & Sánchez, 2008; Ruiz-Barbadillo, Gómez, &
Carrera, 2006; Xu, Carson, Fargher, & Jiang, 2013; Xu, Jiang, Fargher, & Carson,
2011; Zdolsek & Jagric, 2011), auditors are somewhat reluctant to issue either of these
last two opinions, and it can be appreciated that, in general, there is a tendency to
classify reports into two major sections, favourable reports and qualified reports,
including in the latter qualified, refused and unfavourable reports.
4.3. Methodology
The hypotheses put forward were tested by means of a regression analysis, in order to esti-
mate the mean number of errors that we can find in a report depending on the type of opin-
ion and the type of auditor. As we are trying to describe the relationship between a discrete
count variable, number of errors, and the independent explanatory variables type of opin-
ion and type of auditor, the most appropriate analysis is negative binomial regression for
the case of insignificant errors and the Poisson regression for significant errors.
Using the Poisson regression model we describe the relationship between a discrete
variable associated with a counting process Y and one or more explanatory variables. If
the variable Y follows a Poisson distribution of parameter λ>0 then E[Y] = λ and Var
[Y] = λ. Furthermore, its probability mass function will be given by (see Abraira &
Pérez, 1996):
P Y ¼ yð Þ ¼ e
kky
y!
with y ¼ 0; 1; 2. . . (1)
The Poisson regression model that relates the response variable Y and k explanatory
variables, can be described as:
ln k ¼ a0 þ a1X1 þ . . .þ akXk with E Y½  ¼ k (2)
We will use the likelihood ratio test to measure the goodness of fit of the model,6
accepting that the model fits the observations if the critical level of the test is lower than
the level of significance set (0.05). To measure the influence of each of the explanatory
variables on the response variable we will use the Wald test.
Since the expected value and the variance of a Poisson-distributed random variable
coincide, we have to verify if this hypothesis is true. If it is not, the relationship
between the count variable Y and the explanatory variable can be modelled by means of
a negative binomial regression. In this case E[Y] = λ and we will assume that
Var Y½  ¼ kþ dk2. The case of the Poisson regression corresponds to the value δ = 0.
To choose between the two regression models, we will use the Lagrange multiplier test
(see Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). If we obtain an insignificant value from this test, the
Poisson model (δ=0), will be preferable over the negative binomial regression model.
5. Analysis of results
5.1. Testing of hypotheses
We are going to present the results obtained in the empirical study by means of regres-
sion analysis (negative binomial and Poisson), but first we must check that a variable
that follows a Poisson distribution has the characteristic that its mean and variance coin-
cide. For the variable number of significant errors this characteristic is fulfilled, but the
212 M. Mareque et al.
same does not occur with the variable number of insignificant errors. Hence, we sought
another alternative to the Poisson regression model for the relationship between the
count variable Y (number of insignificant errors) and the explanatory variables (type of
opinion and type of auditor), by means of the negative binomial regression model. We
used the Lagrange multiplier test, whose null hypothesis affirms that the appropriate
model is a Poisson regression; the alternative hypothesis affirms that it is a negative
binomial regression, which is a test to justify the choice between the two models.
In Tables 2 and 3, we summarise the results obtained from the tests for each of the
variables insignificant errors and significant errors. Table 2 shows that the value of the
Lagrange multiplier test is significant and therefore we prefer the negative binomial
regression model over that of the Poisson model. On the other hand, Table 3 shows the
opposite, the value of the said test being insignificant, so we prefer the Poisson regres-
sion model.
5.2. Regression models: negative binomial and Poisson
We considered a negative binomial regression model and a Poisson regression model,
with the aim of estimating the average number of insignificant errors for the former and
the number of significant errors for the latter, that we can find in an audit report as a
function of the type of opinion and of the type of auditor. The general equation on the
basis of the coefficients of the model would be of the form:
ln E Y½ ð Þ ¼ a0 þ a1X1 þ a2X2 þ a3X3 (3)
And the general expression that will allow us to estimate the mean number of insignifi-
cant and significant errors per report as a function of the type of auditor and of the type
of opinion is given by:
E Y½  ¼ ea0þa1X1þa2X2þa3X3 (4)
where X1 corresponds to the factor type of opinion, X2 and X3 correspond to the factor
type of auditor, the codification of which is shown as follows:
(5)
The reference level for the type of opinion is the ‘qualified’ opinion and for the type of
auditor it is ‘individual auditor’.
We performed a robust estimation of the parameters of the model, and the goodness
of fit was tested by means of the Omnibus test. The values of the test for each of the
years in Tables 4 and 5 show that the model is adequate, as in all the years the critical
level (p) is lower than the level of significance (0.05), rejecting the null hypothesis.7
This implies that the model adequately describes the relationship between the variables






National audit firm 0 1
Individual auditor 0 0
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Furthermore, for each of Tables 4 and 5 we can appreciate the following.
 The first column includes the estimations of the parameters α0, α1, α2 and α3,
which we can see have a negative sign, indicating that when we pass from the
qualified opinion to the favourable and from the individual auditor to the compa-
nies or to the multinationals, the mean number of insignificant errors and of sig-
nificant errors found in a report decreases.
 In the second column, we find the estimation of the variation experienced by the
mean number of insignificant errors and of significant errors per report according
to the type of opinion and the type of auditor.
 Finally, the third column contains the critical level associated with each test. The
hypotheses to be tested are: H0: α1=0 as against H1: α1≠0; H0: α2=0 as against
H1: α2≠0; H0: α3=0 as against H1: α3≠0. If the critical level of the test p<0.05 we
reject the null hypothesis. which permits us to study whether the parameters are
significantly different from zero, i.e. whether there are statistically significant dif-
ferences between the types of auditor and the types of opinion. On the one hand,
therefore, we can observe that these parameters are significantly different from
zero (see Table 4) in all the years. On the other hand, we can assign zero to the
value of the coefficient associated to the companies in the year 2005 (p=0.156),
indicating that there are no differences between companies and individual Audi-
tors during this year. This is not the case in the remaining years where the coeffi-
cients are non-null significantly, because the critical value of each of the tests is
smaller than 0.05’.
Taking into account the regression model that we have just set out and the estima-
tion of the coefficients, we can estimate the mean number of insignificant and significant
errors that a report might contain according to the type of opinion and the type of audi-
tor. In Tables 6 and 7, we give the estimation of these values for each year, observing:
Table 3. Contrast of Lagrange multipliers: significant errors.
2004 2005 2006 2007
χ2 Lagrange multiplier (d.f.) 1.088 (1 d.f.) 1.319 (1 d.f.) 2.156 (1 d.f.) 3.688 (1 d.f.)
Critical level Lagrange (0.05) 0.297 0.251 0.142 0.055
Note: (d.f.): Degrees of freedom.
Source: Authors’ estimation.
Table 2. Contrast of Lagrange multipliers: insignificant errors.
2004 2005 2006 2007








Critical level Lagrange (0.05) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: (d.f.): Degrees of freedom.
Source: Authors’ estimation.
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 estimation of the mean number of insignificant errors and of significant errors by
type of auditor. The mean number of errors of both groups that might be con-
tained in a report with a qualified opinion is higher than if its opinion is favour-
able, for either type of auditor;
 estimation of the mean number of insignificant errors and of significant errors by
type of auditor and by type of opinion. The mean number of errors that might be
contained in a report for either of the types of opinion is higher if issued by an
individual auditor than if issued by a company or a multinational.
6. Conclusions
The results of the study imply the non-acceptance of the hypotheses put forward, both
for the case of insignificant errors and that of significant errors, since through the regres-
sion models used and having verified the adequate goodness of fit of both models by
means of the Omnibus test, we can conclude that the type of opinion and the type of
auditor influence the mean number of insignificant and significant errors that a report
may contain. These results are in line with those of other similar studies, such as Kier
and Lavesson (2010), who conclude that the audit reports of Swedish firms contain both
deviations in relation to the Swedish regulations, and deviations in relation to the
content of the report, and Šapina and Ibrahimagić (2011) who obtain evidence that audit
reports in Bosnia and Herzegovina contain deviations both in form and in content, and
establish the causes of the errors detected.
Consequently, irrespective of the type of opinion contained in the audit report, audi-
tors working individually have a higher propensity to issue audit reports with errors,
both insignificant and significant, than companies or multinationals.
In addition, taking into account each of the regression models and the values of their
coefficients, we estimated the mean number of insignificant and significant errors that
might be contained in an audit report for each of the years studied, according to the
different values of the type of opinion and of the type of auditor, and we can affirm
that:
 the mean number of errors, both insignificant and significant, that a report might
contain, whatever the type of auditor, is higher in reports with a qualified opinion
than in reports with a favourable opinion;
 The mean number of errors, both insignificant and significant, that might be con-
tained in a report issued by an individual auditor, whatever his or her opinion, is
higher than if the report is issued by a company or a multinational.
We believe that the Spanish Institute of Accountancy and Audit of Accounts (ICAC)
must be aware of the importance of carrying out more exhaustive quality controls and,
as far as our study is concerned, referring to the issue of an adequate report in terms of
the content of the Technical Auditing Standards. There is an important role that must be
played in this sense by both the ICAC and the corporations of auditors, both of which
are aware of the existence of errors in audit reports. They are bodies that can and must
solve this problem by means of technical and quality controls and of continuous training
of auditors. With the publication of the new Law on Auditing of Accounts in the year
2010, the rules establish that the ICAC will exclusively assume the competences of
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quality control. The reform includes the possibility that this body, through its direct
supervision, can agree with third parties, including corporations of auditors, the tasks
relating to quality control. Therefore the mechanisms of control are in motion.
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Notes
1. Resolution of Technical Standards of Auditing, January 19, Institute of Accounting and
Auditing (1991). International Audit Standards, 700 – 799: Conclusions of the audit and
reports.
2. Resolution of Technical Standards of Auditing, January 19, Institute of Accounting and
Auditing (1991).
3. According to Recommendation 2003/361/CE, of 6 May 2003, the category of micro-firms,
small and medium enterprises consists of firms that employ fewer than 250 people and whose
annual turnover does not exceed €50 million or whose annual general balance sheet does not
exceed €43 million.
4. Article 3 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2011, July 1 (2011), by which the revised text of the
Spanish Audit Law Accounts is approved.
5. International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 700 Forming an opinion and reporting on financial
statements and ISA 705 Modifications to the Opinion in the Independent Auditor’s Report.
6. This test is based on calculating the increase in the statistic –2 × the Naperian logarithm of
the likelihood function when evaluating it at the beginning of the adjustment of the model,
without considering any of the explanatory variables, (–2LLoINICIAL), and on finishing the
adjustment with the independent variables included in the model (–2LLoFINAL). The
difference is known as the increase in likelihood and is denoted by Δ-2Llo. This statistic is
distributed according to a Chi-squared distribution with k degrees of freedom, k being the
number of independent variables in the model. The hypothesis to be tested, generally called
the Omnibus test, is:
H0: α1 =…αk=0.
H1: αi≠0 for some i.
and the test statistic is (Álvarez-Cáceres, 2007):
D2LLo ¼ 2LLoinicialð Þ  2LLofinalð Þ
7. The null hypothesis affirms that the model does not fit the data, as against the alternative: that
the model does fit the data.
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Appendix
Table A1. Principal errors detected in audit reports.
Insignificant errors Significant errors
 The letterhead of the audit company is
missing
 Title of report incorrect.
 Incorrect identification of addressees.
 Incorrect identification of the firm
audited: use of commercial or
abbreviated names.
 Auditor’s registry number is missing or
incorrectly placed.
 Errors in the date of issue of the report.
 Spelling errors.
 Paragraphs badly numbered.
 Introductory and scope paragraph:
 Inclusion of additional data not
necessary according to the Technical
Audit Standards.
 Incorrect description of the number of
the intermediate paragraph containing
the limitation.
 Incorrect description of annual
accounts.
 Comparability paragraph:(1)
Non-inclusion of, or incorrect, obligatory
information on the audit of the previous
year: date of report, opinion of report,
whether the auditors agree with last year’s.
 Emphasis of matter paragraph:
 This emphasis paragraph placed after
the opinion.
 Information lacking or incorrectly
expressed.
 Explanatory paragraphs of qualified
opinion:
 Not mentioning the application of
alternative methods of audit, practical
in the circumstances, for obtaining
sufficient and adequate evidence that
would permit the limitation found to
be eliminated.
 Writing two different qualifications in
a single paragraph.
 Writing the qualifications in an
unclear manner.
 Opinion paragraph:
 Expressions (‘except for’) or words
forming part of expressions, are
lacking.
 The number or situation of the
qualifications paragraph is not
indicated.
 The name of the company or the
specific date of closure of annual
accounts is not indicated.
 Introductory and scope paragraph:
 No reference is made in this paragraph
to the presence of scope restrictions
later included in the corresponding
paragraphs explaining the qualified
opinion and included in the opinion
paragraph.
 Errors in the date of the audited
annual accounts, making reference to
the date of last year’s annual accounts.
 Comparability paragraph:
 Includes wording not in force in
current models of reports.
 Not making reference to the chart of
annual financial changes when the
company is obliged to formulate it,
despite including it in the management
report.
 Explanatory paragraphs of qualified
opinion:
 Confusion between different types of
qualifications or non-inclusion thereof
in the intermediate paragraphs.
 The effect of certain qualifications on
the annual accounts is not quantified.
 Inclusion of qualifications in emphasis
paragraphs.
 Repeatedly failing to mention the use
or application of practical alternative
audit procedures to obtain sufficient
adequate evidence to permit
elimination of the scope limitation
found.
 Confusing wording and lack of
information.
 Repeated inclusion of the same scope
limitation several years running,
without justifying the use of any
alternative procedure that might permit
elimination of that limitation.
 Opinion paragraph:
 Absence of certain expressions relating
to the opinion on the contents of the
financial statements.
 The effects of certain qualifications
only affect a part of the annual
accounts.
 Situations mentioned in the
intermediate paragraphs are not
included in the opinion.
 Inclusion of erroneous data: date of
closure of previous year or name of
another company.
(Continued)
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Appendix (Continued).
Insignificant errors Significant errors
 Includes unnecessary additional
information.
 The paragraph is not worded as laid
down in the Technical Standards on
reports for each type of qualification.
 Non-existence of the paragraph.
 Inclusion of two opinions.
Source: Author’s survey.
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